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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Bruce Reed was convicted of enticing of children over the internet and the district court
imposed a unified sentence of eleven years, with two years fixed. On appeal, Mr. Reed asserts
that there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Reed
was using the internet to "solicit, lure, or persuade" a minor child under sixteen to engage in
sexual acts. Additionally, Mr. Reed contends that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing an excessive sentence in light of the mitigating factors present in this case.
Statement of the Facts
On September 29, 2009, "bsubearsguitar" initiated an online chat with "borahjenny" in a
romance by location Yahoo chat room. (Tr., p.166, L.8 - p.167, L.20, p.173, L.5

p.174, L.8.)

Yahoo makes it clear that no one under the age of eighteen should be participating in an online
conversation in the romance chat rooms. (Tr., p.307, L.24

p.308, L.12.) "Bsubearsguitar"

identified himself as a twenty-five year old male from Boise while "borahjenny" identified
herself as a fifteen year old female from Boise. (9/29/09 Chat, p.1.)1 In reality, "borahjenny"
was a middle aged male police detective named Kenneth Smith and Mr. Reed acknowledged that
he was chatting as "bsubearsguitar." (Tr., p.157, Ls.17-20, p.172, Ls.1-3, p.484, Ls.1-23.) Over
the next five months in which the online chats were occurring, Mr. Reed did not attempt to
personally meet with "borahjenny," despite Detective Smith's attempts, on numerous occasions,

1 Each of the chats is separated by date, which is identified at the top of each page. All of the chats are included in
State's Exhibit 2 and are separately numbered. For ease of reference, the documents contained in Exhibit 2 will be
cited in accordance with the date in which they occur and page numbers contained therein: For example, the chat
occurring on September 29,2009 is cited herein as "9/29/09 Chat, p .. "
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to facilitate a meeting with Mr. Reed. (See 11125/09 Chat, p.1; 111211 0 Chat, pp.1-2, 1125/10
Chat, pp.2-3.)
In fact, when Detective Smith asked Mr. Reed for his telephone number and address,
Mr. Reed refused to provide it. (Tr., p.358, L.24 - p.259, L.4 (Mr. Reed declining to give his
address and telephone number to "borahjenny"), p.382, Ls.11-16 (Mr. Reed declining to give his
telephone number to "borahjenny").) Moreover, on a number of different occasions throughout
the five months, Mr. Smith questioned "borahjenny" as to whether she was with law
enforcement. (Chat 11/23/09, pp.2-3 (Mr. Reed asking "borahjenny" if she is associated with the
law and asking "borahjenny to unlock "her" Myspace account so Mr. Reed can see "her"),
1120110 Chat, p.2 (Mr. Reed suspecting "borahjenny" is law enforcement).)

In fact, even

Detective Reed believed that Mr. Reed was "undecided" as to whether "borahjenny" was with
lawenforcement. (Tr., p.389, Ls.7-22.)
Ultimately law enforcement officers obtained a search warrant for Mr. Reed's residence
and executed the search warrant on February 23, 2010.

(Tr., p.301, L.13

p.302, L.10.)

Mr. Reed was charged by Information with enticing of children over the internet. (R., pp.30-31.)
Mr. Reed proceeded to trial and was convicted of enticing of children over the internet.
(R., pp.83-100, 117.) Defense counsel then filed a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, arguing
that the trial evidence was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict. (R., pp.122, 131-136.)
Following a hearing on the motion, the district court denied Mr. Reeds Motion for Judgment of
Acquittal. (R., p.159; 11112110 Tr., p.4, L.4

p.32, L.25.) At sentencing the State asked the

district court to impose the statutory maximum aggregate sentence of fifteen years. (4/20111 Tr.,
p.16, Ls.3-1 0.) Defense counsel for Mr. Reed sought a unified sentence of eight years, with one
2
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year fixed. (4/20111 Tr., p.25, Ls.20-25.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of eleven
years, with two years fixed, upon Mr. Reed. (R., pp.l89-191.) Mr. Reed filed apro se Notice of
Appeal timely from the district court's judgment of conviction. (R., pp.193-197.)
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ISSUES

1.

Was there sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Reed was
using the internet to "solicit, lure, or persuade" a minor child under sixteen to engage in
sexual acts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an aggregate sentence of
eleven years, upon Mr. Reed, following his conviction for enticing children over the
internet?

4
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I.

ARGUMENT
There Was Insufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Mr. Reed Was
Using The Internet To "Solicit, Lure, Or Persuade" A Minor Child Under Sixteen To Engage In
Sexual Acts
A.

Introduction
Between September 29, 2009 and February 10, 2010 Mr. Reed chatted with

"borahjenny", a middle aged police detective with Ada County, approximately 32 times. While
the chats contained gratuitous language and adult oriented subject matter, Mr. Reed did not
attempt to personally meet "borahjenny" or provide the detective with any of his contact
information to facilitate a meeting. Rather, it appears as though Mr. Reed was skeptical from the
very beginning as to "borahjenny's" true identity and more interested in engaging in "fantasy
chat" with another unidentified individual in an adult only chat room. As such, the State failed
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Reed was using the internet to "solicit, seduce, lure,
or persuade" a minor child under sixteen to engage in sexual acts.

B.

There Was Insufficient Evidence To Prove Beyond A Reasonable Doubt That Mr. Reed
Was Using The Internet To "Solicit, Lure, Or Persuade" A Minor Child Under Sixteen
To Engage In Sexual Acts
Mr. Reed asserts that there was insufficient evidence to convict him enticing of children

over the internet. Specifically, the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that Mr. Reed was using the internet to "solicit, lure, or persuade" a minor child under sixteen to
engage in sexual acts and there was not sufficient evidence to prove that Mr. Reed believed
"borahjenny" was a minor child.

5
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An accused's right to demand proof of the State's case beyond a reasonable doubt is of
"surpassing importance." Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000). The right to
demand proof beyond all reasonable doubt is a bedrock constitutional principle. See In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) ("Although virtually unanimous adherence to the reasonable-doubt

standard in common-law jurisdictions may not conclusively establish it is as a requirement of
due process, such adherence does 'reflect a profound judgment about the way in which law
should be enforced and justice administered.'" (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155
(1968)). "Simply stated, the fact that defendant is 'probably' guilty does not equate with guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt." People v. Ehlert, 811 N.E.2d 620,631 (Ill. 2004).
In State v. Crawford, 130 Idaho 592 (et. App. 1997), it was stated that:
[a]ppellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited in scope. A
judgment of conviction, entered upon a jury verdict, will not be overturned on
appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact
could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt . . . [w]e will not substitute our
view for that of the jury as to the credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be
given to the testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
evidence ... [m]oreover, we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prosecution.
Id. at 594-595 (citations omitted).

In State v. Mitchell, 130 Idaho 134 (et. App. 1997), it was noted that, "[ e]vidence is
regarded as substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely upon it in determining
whether a disputed point of fact has been proved." Id. at 135. "The challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence is not based on a technical or subtle defect. The defense simply says that there
was not enough admissible evidence to convict the defendant." State v. Faught, 127 Idaho 873,
877 (et. App. 1995).
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Mr. Reed was charged by Information with enticing of children over the internet pursuant
to I.e. §18-1509A(1), which provides:
A person aged eighteen (18) years or older shall be guilty of a felony if he or she
knowingly uses the internet to solicit, seduce, lure, persuade or entice by words or
actions, or both, a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years or a person the
defendant believes to be a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years to
engage in any sexual act with or against the child where such act is a violation of
chapter 15, 61 or 66, title 18, Idaho Code.
IDAHO CODE § 18-1509A(1) (2009). The jury was then instructed that in order to find Mr. Reed
guilty of enticing a child over the internet, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1.

On or between September 29,2009, and February 10,2010;

2.

in the State of Idaho;

3.

the defendant BRUCE E. REED;

4.

being a person aged eighteen (18) years or older;

5.

who knowingly used the internet to solicit, lure, or entice by words or actions, or
both;

6.

a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years, or a person the defendant
believed to be a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years;

7.

to engage in a sexual act with or against the child that would constitute Lewd
Conduct with a Minor Child under Sixteen (16).

(1.1. No.3.)

Mr. Reed asserts the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he

"knowingly used the internet to solicit, lure, or entice by words or actions, or both." Idaho Code
§ 18-1509A, as it existed at the time of the allegations required something more than just
chatting online with person in a sexual manner, as evidenced that the changes to the statute
enacted in 2012 and the case law interpreting the enticing of a child statute. This past legislative
session, the Idaho Legislature amended I.C. § 18-1509A and added the following section, "(4) In
7
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a prosecution under this section, it is not necessary for the prosecution to show an act described
in chapter 15,61 or 66, title 18, Idaho Code, actually occurred." IDAHO CODE § 18-1509A(4)
(2012) (emphasis added). "When the legislature changes the language of a statute, it is presumed
that they intended to change the application or meaning of that statute." Woodvine v. Triangle
Dairy, Inc., 106 Idaho 716, 721 (1984) (citing Hawkins v. Chandler, 88 Idaho 20 (1964». Thus,

it is apparent that the former statute, under which Mr. Reed is charged, required the prosecution
to "show an act" described the relevant criminal statutes "actually occurred;" or something
substantially more than simple online communication.
Consistent with the legislative intent behind the 2012 amendment, it appears that 2009
version, which is applicable to Mr. Reed, has been interpreted to require some act substantially
more nefarious than chatting in a virtual room. See State v. Glass, 146 Idaho 77 (Ct. App. 2008).
In Glass, the defendant was charged with enticement of a child over the internet as set forth in
I.C. § 18-1509A(l). Glass argued that his proposition to "masturbate in front ofa child is not in
contravention of I.C. § 18-1509A(1)" because said conduct is not done "with or against" the
child. Id. 146 Idaho at 83. The Glass Court agreed with Glass, that he could not be in violation
of the statute "by his proposed masturbation." The Court then went on to analyze "whether there
was sufficient evidence presented to conclude that Glass sought to seduce or lure
'lisa200215ncal' to participate in sexual activity in addition to the proposal of masturbation such
that he was soliciting a violation of code sections identified in I.C. § 18-1509A." Id. at 83-84
(emphasis in original). In finding that there was sufficient evidence for the conviction the court
stated:
While Glass's proposition to masturbate in front of "lisa200215ncal" alone was
not sufficient to warrant conviction under the enticement statute, there was

8
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sufficient evidence from which a jury could find that he was also soliciting further
acts such that he was in violation of sections implicated in section 18-1509A,
namely section 18-1508 which defines lewd conduct with a minor under age
sixteen.
While "letsgetkinky831" only explicitly referred to plans of
masturbation, the context of the discussion makes it evident that the proposed
masturbation was but a stem in the process of luring or seducing "lisa200215ncal"
to direct sexual contact and by showing up at the apartment had taken a
substantial step toward this end.
Id. at 85 (emphasis added). Thus, in order to obtain a conviction under the charged statute it is

clear that a suspect must not only engage in sexually oriented online chat with a minor child
under sixteen or a person the suspect believes to be a minor child under sixteen but must also
take a substantial step toward the sexual contact, such as showing up at the apartment.
The conduct in the instant case does not rise to the actual requirements of the statute.
Throughout the five month period, Mr. Reed refused to provide his telephone or cell phone
number and refused to give his actual location to "borahjenny." (See 11130109 Chat, pp.1-2, Tr.,
p.358, L.24

p.259, L.4 (Mr. Reed declining to give his address and telephone number to

"borahjenny"), p.382, Ls.11-16 (Mr. Reed declining to give his telephone number to
"borahjenny").)

Moreover, Mr. Reed did not attempt to meet or take any action to meet

"borahjenny" despite "her" attempts to set up a rendezvous, including providing "her" address to
Mr. Reed. (See 11125/09 Chat, p.1; 1112/10 Chat, pp.1-2, 1125/10 Chat, pp.2-3.) In fact, the only
thing Mr. Reed did was engage in an online conversation with a person he suspected was a law
enforcement officer.

(See Chat 11123/09, pp.2-3 (Mr. Reed asking "borahjenny" if she is

associated with the law and asking "borahjenny to unlock "her" Myspace account so Mr. Reed
can see "her"); 1120/1 0 Chat, p.2 (Mr. Reed suspecting "borahjenny" is law enforcement); 2/3/1 0
Chat, pp.1-2 (Mr. Reed stating, "I can't think of anything that would prove ur real ... well I
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mean not affiliated with the police ... maybe if u had a myspace with a bunch of friends that
would help") (errors in original).)
Accordingly, there was insufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable
doubt that Mr. Reed was using the internet to "solicit, lure, or persuade" a minor child under
sixteen to engage in sexual acts and as a result, Mr. Reeds conviction should be vacated.
II.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed An Aggregate Sentence Of Eleven
Years, Upon Mr. Reed Following His Conviction For Enticing Children Over The Internet, In
Light Of The Mitigating Factors Present In His Case

Mr. Reed asserts that, given any view of the facts, his aggregate sentence of eleven years
is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record, giving
consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the
public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '" [w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence. '" State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Reed does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Reed must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. !d. (citing State
v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121
Idaho 385 (1992)).

The governing criteria, or objectives of criminal punishment are:
10
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(1)

protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility
of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v. Wolfe,
99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978), overruled on other grounds by State v. Coass%, 136 Idaho 138
(2001».
Mr. Reed asserts that when reviewing the governing criteria in light of the facts and
circumstances of this case, his aggregate sentence of eleven years is unduly harsh. The first
objective a court is to review is protection of society. The instant case does not involve touching
for physical contact with a minor victim. Rather, involved admittedly inappropriate conversation
over the internet with a ground male adult that portrayed himself as a fifteen year old female
high school student. Moreover, unlike the "typical enticement case" where a suspect is caught
attempting to meet the mysterious minor, Mr. Reed was given multiple opportunities to meet
"borahjenny" and affirmatively refused to do so. (See Tr., p.279, L.23 - p.280, L.7, p.390, L.23
- p.391, L.12, p.409, L.13 - p.410, L.12.) In fact, Mr. Reed refused to provide "borahjenny"
with his contact information despite "her" numerous requests. (Tr., p.358, L.24

p.259, LA,

p.382, Ls.11-16.) Thus, even if Mr. Reed had been talking to a minor, she would have been
unable to contact him or go to his residence because the minor would not have had his physical
address or telephone number. As such, society is appropriately protected in this case not with a
long aggregate sentence, but rather by limiting Mr. Reed's access to online communications.
Deterrence, both specific and general, is also met in this case. With regard to specific
deterrence, although Mr. Reed certainly has acted "impulsively and irresponsibly," the
appropriate response is not a long aggregate sentence, but in providing the professional treatment
necessary to deal with his impulsivity and irresponsibility. Most likely, Mr. Reed's impulsivity
11
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and irresponsibility will significantly dissipate as Mr. Reed grows older. Moreover, Mr. Reed
has strong support from friends and family as evidenced by the large number of individuals
writing letters to the court in support ofMr. Reed. (PSI, pp.l06-134.) It is these individuals that
provide Mr. Reed with the support and guidance to continue on his path of once again becoming
a productive member of society. With regard to general deterrence, Mr. Reed asserts that an
aggregate eight year term, which is what he is seeking in the instant case, is sufficient to deter
society from engaging in inappropriate online chats. Additionally, it is important to reiterate that
Mr. Reed never made himself available or attempted to meet "borahjenny." Likewise, Mr. Reed
contends that the lengthy pretrial detention, subsequent prison confinement, and length parole is
sufficient punishment/retribution for his online conversations.
Finally, Mr. Reed can be adequately rehabilitated. Mr. Reed is a bright young man from
a supportive and successful family.

(See PSI, pp.6-8, 106-108, 115-117.)

Mr. Reed's

impulsivity and irresponsibility can be addressed through professional treatment and will
naturally continue to dissipate as he ages. It is also important to note that Mr. Reed is not
addicted to alcohol or drugs, has no significant mental health issues, and the instant offense did
not involve any physical violence or touching. Accordingly, in light of the foregoing, Mr. Reed
asserts that the district court erred in imposing a sentence in excessive of eight years.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Reed respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction. Alternatively, he
asks that this Court reduce his aggregate sentence to eight years.

12
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DATED this ~ day of June, 2012.
BRADY LAW, CHARTERED

By: Eric D. Fredericksen
Attorney for Bruce E. Reed
Appellant Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
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day of June, 2012, I caused a true and correct

copy of the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the following
manner:
Kenneth K. Jorgensen
Idaho Attorney General's Office
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

[x]
[]
[]
[]
[]
[]

u.s. Mail, Postage Prepaid
Express Mail
Hand Delivery
Facsimile Transmission
Federal Express
Electronic Mail

Eric D. Fredericksen
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